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Dreher: Domestic Relations
DOMESTIC RELATIONS
JAmrEs F.

DRi-HER*

The most interesting case decided by the Supreme Court during
the review period in the field of Domestic Relations was The Peoples
National Bank of Greenville v. Manos Brothers, Inc., et al.,1 dealing as it does with (a) foreign divorces; (b) estoppel by participating in them; and (c) the stringency of the rule against attacking the
legitimacy of a child born during wedlock.
The action started as a simple foreclosure of a real estate mortgage with all parties possibly interested in the real estate being joined
as defendants, but the answers of the defendants promptly turned
the cause into a contest as to inheritance between the deceased landowner's divorced wife and the child of that marriage on one band and
his second wife on the other. The decedent had married his first wife
in Greece in 1904, brought her to Greenville, South Carolina, in 1905,
returned to Greece with her in 1913, and left her there in 1915 to
return to Greenville alone. He visited her in 1919-20, and when he
left her to return to Greenville she was pregnant. Four months later
she gave birth to the son who was to become a defendant in this
case. Neither she nor the boy ever came to the United States until
after the present action was pending.
In 1923 the decedent obtained a divorce from the first wife in the
courts of Georgia upon what purported to be service by publication
In 1925 he married the woman who considered herself his wife at
the time of his death and to whom his will left a substantial interest
in the property under foreclosure.
The first wife set up the invalidity of the Georgia divorce, and
the court had little difficulty in finding it invalid. As typical in such
cases, the husband was not truly domiciled in Georgia; and further,
more, as the court held, the wife was not properly served, the only
evidence of service by publication being publication of the summons
in a Georgia newspaper with no evidence of any attempt to give
actual notice to the wife in Greece. The court further found that
there was such confusion between English and Greek proper names
in the published notice as to make it bad on that score.
The contention was then made that the first wife and her son
were estopped from questioning the validity of the Georgia divorce.
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Reliance was had upon Watson v. Watson2 and Ex Parte Niinmer.s
In those cases there had been participation or acquiescence in the invalid divorce proceedings by the divorced spouse. This element was
entirely lacking in the present case. The court held that the doctrine
of estoppel must have flexible application in such situations; that
there is no inflexible rule that "wherever a decedent would have
been estopped to question the validity of a divorce obtained by him
or with his help, his heirs are likewise estopped"; and that, furthermore, neither the first wife nor her son was subject to the doctrine of
estoppel - she, because she was claiming dower rather than as an
heir, and the son, because he was invoking a statute4 expressly passed
for his protection in limiting the property which a decedent may leave
to a mistress or illigitimate child.
The second wife had attempted to prove that the Greece-born
son was in truth not the decedent's child. The only proof that she
had on this was the decedent's statement in his will that he did not
recognize the boy in Greece "as my true son" and the allegation in
his Georgia divorce complaint that when he returned to Greece in
1919 he found his wife pregnant- an allegation which the decedent
himself had modified by an amendment. The court held, quite soundly under the decision in Barr'sNext of Kin v. Cherokee, Inc.,5 that
since both of these written statements were by the husband they
must be excluded from consideration because of the rule that neither
a husband nor a wife may testify as to non-access between them in
any case where the legitimacy of a child born in wedlock is in issue.
The only general significance of Miller v. Miller6 lies in the application of the "clean hands" doctrine to divorce cases. The wife in
that case had sued for separate maintenance and alimony on the
ground of physical cruelty, and the husband had counterclaimed for
a divorce on the grounds of physical cruelty, habitual drunkenness
and desertion. The master and the circuit court found that the husband had no basis for his charges, but granted the wife's prayer for
separate maintenance and alimony with some apparent reluctance, the
circuit judge stating that "no one can read the record here and reach
the conclusion that either (of the parties) is wholly blameless in this
controversy." The husband seized upon this statement to argue on
his appeal that the "clean hands" doctrine must be applied to deny
alimony to the wife. The court, in an Opinion by Mr. Justice Oxner,
172 S.C. 362, 174 S.E. 33 (1934).
3. 212 S.C. 311, 47 S.E. 2d 716 (1948).
4. CODM OF LAWS OP SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 §§ 19-238 and 57-310.
5. 220 S.C. 447, 68 S.E. 2d 440 (1951).
6. 225 S.C. 274, 82 S.E. 2d 119 (1954).
2.
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held that the "clean hands" doctrine did generally apply in divorce
cases 7 but that it did not apply so as to require a party who otherwise would be entitled to a divorce or separate maintenance to be
"entirely blameless." The court said that it must be recognized that
most marital difficulties are to some extent the fault of both parties
and that a rule requiring a completely blameless life on the part of
a person seeking marital relief would be unreasonably harsh.
Rodgers v. Herron8 was a most interesting decision upon the duty
of a trustee to investigate reports concerning the common law marriage of a trust beneficiary entitled to income only during her widowhood; but from the viewpoint of the law of Domestic Relations the
only importance of the decision lies in its recognition that since a
common law marriage "depends upon facts and circumstances evidencing a mutual agreement to live together as husband and wife,
and not in concubinage", the existence of such a marriage, and particularly the time of its creation, is extremely difficult of ascertainment. The court said:
Somewhat analogous is the situation that exists where the
issue is insanity. Circumstances may indicate insanity, but ordinarily the fact cannot be established for certainty until there
is an adjudication.
The only other Domestic Relations cases which the court decided
during the review period were run-of-the-mine. In Lyon v. Lyon9
the court held that an allegation, that "the defendant has on occasion
applied physical violence and force to her, even going so far as
choking her on one occasion, when plaintiff's brother stopped him",
was good against demurrer to allege physical cruelty as a ground for
divorce. In Forester v. Forester10 the court reversed an award of
separate maintenance and support in favor of a wife on the ground
that although the evidence established the husband to be "a jealous
and at least occasionally inconsiderate husband" it did not show his
conduct towards his wife to be of such a nature as to justify her
leaving his home and claiming support elsewhere.
7. Citing Nicholson v. Nicholson, 115 S.C. 326, 105 S.E. 700 (1921).
8. 226 S.C. 317, 85 S.E. 2d 104 (1954).
9. 86 S.E. 2d 606 (S.C. 1955).
10. 226 S.C. 311, 85 S.E. 2d 187 (1954).
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